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BANKRUPTCY
By W. HOMER DRAKE, JR.* and

JAMES

E. MASSEY**

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered several opinions in
1975 involving bankruptcy law and practice. This article highlights the
most important of those decisions with a view toward their application by
the practitioner.
I.

JURISDICTION

A frequent pitfall for the general practitioner engaged in litigation in the
bankruptcy court is the failure to recognize the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction. Summary jurisdiction encompasses the
administration of the bankruptcy estate and the rights to property in the
possession of the bankruptcy court, while plenary jurisdiction refers to the
jurisdiction of the federal district court or other courts to determine the
rights of third parties and the bankruptcy receiver or trustee in property
not in possession of the bankruptcy court.' A right to have a matter determined in a plenary action may be waived if objection to the exercise of
summary jurisdiction is not raised prior to a hearing on the merits in the
bankruptcy court.' As any experienced litigator knows, the exercise of the
right to a plenary trial may have decided procedural advantages for a
defendant.
Objection to the exercise of summary jurisdiction by the bankruptcy
court need not be raised in formal pleadings, according to the Fifth Circuit
in In re Airmotive Suppliers, Inc.' In Airmotive Suppliers the bankrupt,
three months prior to filing a Chapter XI petition, delivered to the Internal
Revenue Service three promissory notes having a face value of nearly
$600,000.00 made by the National Airline of Ecuador. The bankrupt and
the IRS had agreed that the notes were to secure the payment of past-due
taxes, penalties and interest, and that the notes could be redeemed by
tendering such taxes, penalties and interest. The assessment of penalties,
however, would have left the estate with nothing out of the proceeds of the
notes. The Government filed a proof of claim for only $253,000.00 for un* Counsel to the law firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia; United
States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia (1964-1976); Adjunct Professor of
Law, Emory University Law School; Mercer University (A.B., 1954; LL.B., 1956); Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate with the law firm of Redfern, Butler & Morgan, Atlanta, Georgia; Emory
University (A.B., 1965); Columbia University (LL.B., 1968); Member, State Bars of Georgia
and New York.
1.

J. MOORE AND L. KING, 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

[hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
2. Id. 23.08, at 532-560.
3. 519 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1975).

23.02, at 438 (14th ed. 1975)
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paid taxes; no provision was made in the proof of claim for penalties.
The trustee brought this action to determine whether the IRS had any
interest in the notes for the purpose of paying pre-petition or post-petition
penalties against the bankrupt. The bankruptcy judge entered an order
declaring that the Government had no interest in the notes or the proceeds
of the notes for the payment of penalties, and the district court affirmed.
The United States appealed, claiming that the bankruptcy judge lacked
jurisdiction.
Section 2a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 4 provides in part that a party failing
to object to summary jurisdiction
by answer or motion filed before the expiration of the time prescribed by
law or rule of court or fixed or extended by order of court for the filing of
an answer to the petition, motion or other pleading to which he is adverse,
he shall be deemed to have consented to such jurisdiction. 5
In Airmotive Suppliers the Government had not raised its objection to
summary jurisdiction in its answer or by motion. Nonetheless, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the judgment of the court below, holding that since the
Government intended to interpose such an objection and since its objection
had been raised before the bankruptcy court, it had preserved its right to
object. The trustee had conceded at the hearing before the bankruptcy
court that the United States had objected to the exercise of summary
jurisdiction, and the issue had been raised anew on appeal to the district
court. The Fifth Circuit further held that the filing of a proof of claim by
the Government for unpaid taxes without penalties did not confer summary jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court.
The fact that the Government had possession of the three promissory
notes with something more than a colorable claim entitled the Government
to a plenary action in the absence of consent. In so deciding, the court
relied upon the recent case of Phelps v. United States.' The Phelps case
presented an almost identical issue on facts even more favorable to the
fiduciary. There, funds had been paid into the hands of an assignee for the
benefit of creditors and the IRS had levied upon those funds. The assignee
claimed no interest in the fund. The receiver argued that the bankruptcy
court had summary jurisdiction to enter a turnover order because the
property was held by a person who made no claim to it. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that the valid levy of the United
States upon the fund gave the Government constructive possession. The
Court rejected the argument that actual possession was necessary and held
that the petitioner's reliance upon section 67c(3)1 of the Act was misplaced
4.
be to
5.
6.
7.

11 U.S.C.A. §1la(7) (Rev. 1966). [References to the Bankruptcy Act hereinafter will
the "Act."]
11 U.S.C.A. §1 et seq. (Rev. 1966).
421 U.S. 330, 95 S.Ct. 1728, 44 L.Ed. 2d 201 (1975).
11 U.S.C.A. §107(c)(3) (Supp. 1976).
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since the issue was not the priority of liens but rather the effect of a tax
levy. In effect, the Court held that the notice of levy and demand were
equivalent to seizure.
Assuming that the oral objection to jurisdiction in Airmotive Suppliers
was in effect a motion, that case appears to be in accordance with decisions
in other circuits.' Nonetheless, the practitioner is cautioned that the raising of jurisdictional defenses is governed by Bankruptcy Rules 712 and 915,
which require the objection to be made by timely motion or answer. What
will be deemed timely may vary depending upon the facts of the case, but
it is clear that an objection made after the entry of an order deciding the
matter under consideration is too late
II.

DISCHARGE

In In re McBee"° the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court's denial
of a husband's and wife's discharge was justified where the bankrupts had
failed to support adequately with records an alleged gambling loss of
$14,000.00. The court rejected the bankrupt husband's contention that
gambling records were inherently impracticable to maintain. The only
evidence of the alleged loss that the husband presented was airline ticket
stubs and hotel receipts. The bankruptcy judge had held that these records
were insufficient to constitute an explanation of the loss of assets within
the meaning of section 14c(7)" of the Act in spite of the fact that gambling
records were by their very nature difficult to obtain. It was uncontroverted
that the money in question belonged solely to the bankrupt's wife, and on
that basis the husband contended that since the money didn't belong to
him, he should not have to account for it. This argument was rejected by
the court since the husband apparently had absolute control over his wife's
income and assets. The court also affirmed the denial of the wife's discharge since the absence of records applied as evenly to her as it did to him.
The court noted that although there was uncontradicted testimony that
she did not know about her husband's gambling spree, she did participate
in a "stealthy handling" of the money, and in any event "collusion would
be virtually impossible to prove.""2
The case of In re Boydston3 involved an attempt by the bankrupt's
creditors to have certain debts declared non-dischargeable under section
17a(2)" of the Act. The bankrupt and his wife had incurred indebtedness
8. See In re Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 464 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1972) and
In re Perspectron, Inc., 422 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1970).
9. 2 Collier 23.08, at 548.
10. 512 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).
11. 11 U.S.C.A. §32c(7) (Supp. 1976).
12. 512 F.2d at 506.
13. 520 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
14. 11 U.S.C.A. §35a(2)(Rev. 1970).
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of almost $32,000.00 in a five-month period prior to the filing of their
petition. Most of the indebtedness was for non-essential personal expenses
and had been charged on credit cards. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy judge's decision that the debts were dischargeable in that the
creditors had not proven subjective intent not to pay for credit purchases.
The Fifth Circuit likewise affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the original findings of fact, and that since
those findings were not clearly erroneous they were binding upon the appellate court. By way of dictum the court stated that "[wihere hopeless
insolvency at the time of purchase makes payment impossible, fraudulent
intent may be inferred.' 5 The creditors, however, had failed to introduce
any evidence concerning the bankrupt's solvency at the time the debts
were incurred.
The Boydston case is notable for the court's indication that in a proper
6
case it would overrule Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell."
In Davison-Paxon
the Fifth Circuit had held that the phrase "obtaining property by false
pretenses or false representations" contained in section 17a(2) did not
encompass credit purchases with no intention of paying for them. 7

III. PROCEDURE
In Windbrooke Development Corp. v. EnvironmentalEnterprises,Inc. 1s
the Fifth Circuit considered the very narrow issue of whether the filing of
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy tolls the four-month statutory period pertaining to preferential transfers where the summons is not issued
until 24 days following the filing of the petition. The court affirmed the
district court's decision and adopted the district court's opinion in full.
The lower court had held that since the Bankruptcy Rules are similar to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the settled interpretation of the latter
rules should govern. Under FED.R.CIv.P. 3, a civil action is commenced by
the filing of a complaint, especially if there has been no lack of diligence
in obtaining service of process. In Windbrooke the action had been properly commenced by the filing of an involuntary petition, and the failure
to issue the summons immediately was not the fault of the petitioning
creditors. Accordingly, the four-month statutory period was tolled; section 60a(1)' 9 of the Act measures the four-month period with respect to
voidable preferences from the date of the filing of the petition.
The scope of appellate review of orders arising out of bankruptcy cases
15.
16.
(1941).
17.
18.
19.

520 F.2d at 1101.
115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564, 61 S.Ct. 841, 9 L.Ed.2d 748
Id. at 191.
524 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1975).
11 U.S.C.A. §96a(1) (Rev. 1968).
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was the subject of In re Durensky.20 In that case, the bankrupt's petition
and schedules filed in 1972 listed the United States as a creditor with
respect to income taxes alleged to be due for the years 1964 and 1965.
Although the Government received notice of the bankruptcy, it never took
any steps to perfect its claim and, in fact, never participated in any way
in the proceedings. On May 25, 1972, the bankruptcy court entered an
order discharging Durensky from his debts. Later that year, the Internal
Revenue Service determined that Durensky did, in fact, owe approximately $90,000.00 in back taxes for the years 1964 and 1965, and served a
"Final Notice Before Seizure" on him demanding payment. The bankrupt
responded by filing in the bankruptcy court an application to determine
the dischargeability of his tax liability under section 17c(1)"' of the Act.
The bankruptcy court issued an order restraining the Government from
seizing any of the bankrupt's property and later denied the IRS's motion
to dismiss the application. The IRS appealed, arguing that the bankruptcy
court had no subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court expressed the
view that the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction, 2 and further held
that the order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was
not appealable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the issue of appealability.
Section 24a2 1 of the Act refers to "proceedings in bankruptcy" and to
"controversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy." That section provides that appeals as a matter of right may be taken from interlocutory or
final orders in proceedings in bankruptcy, but only from final orders in
controversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy. The term "proceedings" relates to matters of administration of the bankrupt's estate, while
the term "controversies" refers to adversary proceedings involving the
right and title to the bankrupt's estate. The Fifth Circuit determined that
the bankrupt's application to determine the dischargeability of a claim
was a "proceeding" rather than a "controversy" within the meaning of the
statute. Nonetheless, the court found that the order was not appealable in
that it did not dispose of any right or duty asserted by the parties and did
not possess any "definitive operative finality." 2' The court was persuaded
that the policy against piecemeal appeals and the policy of expeditious
handling of bankruptcy matters outweighed any practical advantage of an
immediate decision on the jurisdictional point.
Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc. ,2 while not illustrating any principle of
20. 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
21. 11 U.S.C.A. §35c(1) (Supp. 1976).
22. In reliance on the district court's dictum, two other circuits have ruled that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction under §2a(2A) of the Act to determine the dischargeability of
tax liability in similar circumstances. In re Bostwick, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975); In re
Gwilliam, 519 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. 11 U.S.C.A. §47(a) (Rev. 1953).
24. 519 F.2d at 1029.
25. 512 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975).
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bankruptcy law, does emphasize the fact that bankruptcy trustees, in
pursuing claims under the Act against creditors of the bankrupt or others
in plenary actions, must comply with the rules governing plaintiffs generally. In Toyomenka the bankruptcy trustee had filed an action in the
Northern District of Georgia to set aside an alleged voidable preference to
Toyomenka in the amount of $99,524.00. Toyomenka, a New York corporation, was served in New York under the Georgia long-arm statute. "6 The
trustee commenced the action .only two months prior to the expiration of
the two-year statute of limitations. Toyomenka moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that itdid not transact business within Georgia and
that it was therefore not subject to jurisdiction there. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court, holding that under Georgia case law Toyomenka had not transacted business in Georgia within the meaning of the
long-arm statute. By the time the district court had rendered its decision,
the statute of limitations had run, thus preventing the reinstitution of the
lawsuit in New York.
IV.

THE AVAILABILITY OF SET-OFF

In Rochelle v. United States," the Fifth Circuit in a very thorough opinion held that a third party indebted to a bankrupt partner may set off
against that debt its claim against the bankrupt partnership., This case
examines the relationship between sections 5g28 and 6829 of the Act.
The plaintiff, trustee of the estate of a bankrupt partner, sued the
United States to recover an income tax refund admittedly owed to the
bankrupt. The bankrupt had formed a partnership with a corporation in
New York to operate a pavilion at the 1964 New York World's Fair. The
partnership, however, owed the United States withholding and other taxes
for which the United States had filed claims against the bankrupt estates
of both the partnership and the individual partner.
The trustee asserted that under section 5g the Government's claim
against the estate of the partner was subordinated to the claims of other
creditors of the individual partner, and, therefore, the set-off provisions of
section 68 should not be available to the Government. The Government
argued that the individual partner was liable for the partnership's tax
debt, and, therefore, section 5g did not apply. In any event, the Government argued that it was entitled to claim a set-off.
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Government had a claim
against the individual partner, it pointed out that, with certain exceptions
not material to this case, that claim was derived solely from the partner26.
27.
28.
29.

GA. CODE ANN. §24-113.1 (Rev. 1971).
521 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1975).
11 U.S.C.A. §23g (Rev. 1966).
11 U.S.C.A. §108 (Rev. 1953).
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ship's liability for partnership debts. Hence, creditors of a New York
partnership must look to partnership assets before seeking to recover from
individual partners. The court concluded that the Government's claim was
subordinated under section 5g:
[I]t [is] clear that the term "individual debts" in section 5g refers to
debts of the individual partner not imposed upon him derivatively as a
result of partnership debts. Section 5g thus subordinates a partnership
creditor-even though it is also an individual creditor in that it owns a
claim aqainst general partners imposed on the partners because of a partnership liability-to other kinds of individual creditors in the allocation
of assets of the estates of the individual partners.30
Despite the Government's subordinated position under section 5g with
respect to any distribution, the court held that section 68 was available to
permit set-off of the partnership's debt to the Government against the
Government's debt to the individual partner. Thus, the subordination of
a debt under section 5g is not a factor to be considered in applying section
68.
The court discussed at length the two basic fact patterns involving a
partnership, a partner, and a third party which is a creditor of the one and
a debtor of the other. In the first situation, the .third party is indebted to
the partnership but is a creditor of an individual partner. The third party
or the individual partner might seek the benefit of a set-off. In either case,
the other members of the partnership would lose the benefit of their claim
against the third party without any corresponding benefit flowing to them.
Hence, the court held that these debts are not mutual and that set-offs
should not be permitted.
In the second basic factual pattern, an individual partner has a claim
against a third party, which in turn has a claim against the partnership.
In this situation, either the third party or a party sued on the partnership
debt might seek to utilize a set-off. Section 68 is available to a partner who
is a creditor of the third party and who is sued by -the third party on a
partnership debt, but only if the partners are jointly and severally liable
for the partnership's debts. In such case, the debts are clearly mutual.
On the other hand, a third party may seek to set off its claim against a
partnership against a claim of one of the individual partners. This is the
factual pattern of Rochelle in which the Fifth Circuit held that the debts
are mutual within the meaning of section 68.
In Rochelle the court examined the relative positions of the parties with
respect to the set-off to determine whether any party was losing any valuable benefit without a corresponding gain. In raising the defense of set-off,
the third party loses a potential claim against the other partner in the
partnership, but he does so at his own choosing. The individual partner
30.

521 F.2d at 850 (footnote omitted).
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against whom the defense of set-off is raised has no complaint since the
third party could, in any case, have sued him individually on the partnership debt. Finally, the remaining partner or partners of the partnership
have no complaint since they are being relieved of the liability and are not
giving up anything.
In addition to mutuality, a debt must be provable and allowable in order
to be used for set-off under section 68. The Fifth Circuit noted that under
section 631' of the Act, claims for taxes are provable despite the fact that
taxes are not mentioned in that section: "The test is whether the claimant
could have maintained an action against the bankrupt. Partnership claims
are provable against the estates of the partners. '3 As to allowability, the
court noted that the claim of the Government was allowable and that
section 57g 3 of the Act, the only section arguably applicable to the facts
of the case, was not helpful to plaintiff since the Government had not
received a preference.
Finally, the court held that set-off was available to the Government
despite the fact that its claim would otherwise have been subordinated
under section 5g. In so holding, the court relied upon the judicial maxim
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Section 68b specifically requires
that claims be provable, but permits a set-off whether or not a claim is
allowable unless the claim is not allowable under section 57g. Hence, the
court reasoned: "If Congress intended a different result it would have
drawn section 68 more narrowly than to permit set-off of all provable
claims generally with but a single narrow exception. . . . ,, The court also
noted that section 5g, requiring subordination with respect to distributions, was limited just to distribution and that Congress could have drawn
that section more broadly. Further, not to permit the set-off in Rochelle
would give rise to an incongruous interpretation of the Act: a subordinated
claimant, who would be paid in full if there were sufficient assets, would
not be entitled to benefits available to a claimant with a disallowed claim
who would receive nothing even if there were sufficient assets to pay all
claims in full.
V.

PROPERTY PASSING

To

THE TRUSTEE UNDER SECTION 70A(5)

In In re Nunnally, 35 the Fifth Circuit dealt with the issue of dischargeability of a Texas divorce award, the issue of exemption of the cash surren:
der value of the life insurance policy under Texas law, and the issue of the
trustee's interest in the bankrupt's retirement benefits. The first two issues
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

11 U.S.C.A. §103 (Rev. 1953).
521 F.2d at 853 (citations omitted).
11 U.S.C.A. §93(g) (Rev. 1968).
521 F.2d at 855.
506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
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may be of some interest to Texas practitioners but will not be discussed
here. The latter issue is of more general interest. In Nunnally the bankruptcy court and the district court held that the bankrupt's Navy retirement benefits did not constitute property under section 70a(5) 6 of the Act
and hence did not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. Although it is not
apparent on the face of the opinion whether either the appellant or crossappellant challenged the correctness of this decision, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the decision below. The court held that retirement benefits
clearly constituted property rights, that those rights were transferable, and
that pension benefits therefore constitute the type of property that might
pass to the trustee under section 70a(5) of the Act. The court concluded:
"Even if the interest is contingent or subject to postponed enjoyment, it
may pass to the trustee."37 The court found, however, that the benefits
might well be paid when the bankrupt had no other source of income.
Hence, the court affirmed, citing Kokoszka v. Belford. 8 In Kokoszka the
Supreme Court held that if an interest is a wage substitute for a future
period such that the passing of the interest to the trustee would frustrate
the bankrupt's attempt to make a new start in life, the property would not
pass to the trustee.
Another interesting case involving the interpretation of section 70a(5) of
39
the Act is McLoughlin v. Trust Co. of Georgia.
In McLoughlin the bankrupt had a remainder interest in a trust created by his father's will. The
trust instrument provided in part that upon the death or remarriage of the
testator's wife, the trustee should divide the remaining property into as
many equal shares as the testator then had children. The trustee was
authorized to use the corpus of the trust in such amounts as it deemed
necessary for the proper support and education of the testator's children.
At the time that each child reached the age of 21, the trustee was directed
to turn over to that child one-third of his share then held by the trustee;
at age 25, the trustee was directed to turn over one-half of the remaining
property; and, at age 35, the trustee was directed to turn over all of the
remaining shares of the child still in the trustee's hands.
The testator and his wife had died in a common accident in 1962. One
of their children had received his appropriate share at ages 21 and 25. At
age 30, however, this child filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee sought to sell the bankrupt's remaining interest under the trust instrument. The bankrupt and the testamentary trustee
objected on the ground that the interest in the corporate trust was not
property within the meaning of section 70a(5). The bankruptcy court held
that the bankrupt's interest in the trust funds passed to the trustee in
36.
37.
38.
39.

11 U.S.C.A. §110a(5)(Rev. 1970).
506 F.2d at 1026.
417 U.S. 642, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 41 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974).
507 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1975).
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bankruptcy and directed that no further payments be made to the bankrupt from the trust. On appeal, the district court reversed the prohibition
against the bankrupt receiving any future discretionary payments but affirmed the remainder of the bankruptcy judge's judgment that the interest
of the bankrupt passed to the trustee.
The trustee in bankruptcy and the testamentary trustee appealed. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed. Section 70a(5) of the Act provides in part:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if
any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of
the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, except
insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever located . . . (5) property, including rights
of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under
judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered .... ,0
Thus, the "key issue" in McLoughlin was "whether the interest received
by the bankrupt under his father's will was an interest which he could have
transferred prior to or at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.",
The transferability of such an interest is governed by state law, and
under Georgia law, only a vested remainder is transferable. Whether the
interest was vested or contingent depends upon the subjective intent of the
testator. Looking to the terms of the will, the court rejected the argument
of the testamentary trustee that the testator intended to make separate
gifts as each child attained the ages of 21, 25 and 35.
A factor militating strongly in favor of finding that a gift is made presently
with payment postponed is a provision that the recipient receive some
present enjoyment in the property, even though a formal delivery will not
be made until a later date. 2
In deciding that McLoughlin's father intended that his children receive
3
vested remainders, the court relied heavily on Gillespie v. Ellis,"
in which
the Georgia Supreme Court found that a remainder interest was vested
because the beneficiary was to receive income payments prior to the distribution of the corpus. The Fifth Circuit noted that the facts in McLoughlin
even more strongly supported the finding of a vested interest; the will, in
addition to providing for the payment of income to the children, also
provided that the testamentary trustee could invade the corpus if necessary for the support and eduion of the testator's children. Indeed, the
40. 11 U.S.C.A. §110(a)(5)(Rev. 1953).
41. 507 F.2d at 180.
42. 507 F.2d at 183.
43. 168 Ga. 790, 149 S.E. 221 (1929).
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bankruptcy trustee's appeal floundered on this provision in the will.
The court stated that the provision for invasion of principal established
a support trust and that rights to payments from such a trust had historically been held to be nontransferable and not subject to the claims of
creditors. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
any rights which the bankrupt might receive under the support trust did
not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy under section 70a(5) of the Act. The
court supported this holding with citations to section 154 of the Second
Restatement of Trusts" and the early case of Barnett v. Montgomery &
Co."5 in which the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a support trust for a
testator's wife is not subject to levy by creditors because otherwise the
testator's intent would be frustrated.
VI.

PROCEEDINGS UNDER CHAPTER X

In In re FontainebleauHotel Corp.4" the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of a district court sitting in bankruptcy that had preserved the right
of a Chapter X debtor to continue to use its telephone numbers. At the
time the petition was filed, the debtor owed the telephone company approximately $9,000.00. The telephone company notified the debtor that it
had two alternatives under the tariffs issued by the Louisiana Public Service Commission: it could either pay the outstanding pre-bankruptcy debt
and continue with existing service, or begin new service with new telephone
numbers. In either case, the telephone company demanded a substantial
deposit. The Chapter X trustees sued to enjoin the interruption of service
and the requirement of a deposit. The trustees argued, and the court below
found, that the debtor's business would be substantially impaired without
the use of existing numbers and that the company had spent substantial
money advertising those numbers. The telephone company conceded that
it had no business purpose in its demand that the numbers be changed
other than coercing payment of the bill.
On appeal, the telephone company argued that the court below had
improperly considered the issue in a summary rather than a plenary proceeding. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the hotel had "possession" of the telephone numbers and that the most important attribute of
possession was the right of use of the numbers. The court declined to follow
decisions in the Ninth and Second Circuits which had held that the right
to use a telephone number did not constitute possession." In those cases,
the courts had relied upon tariffs drafted by the telephone companies
44.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §154 (1959).

45. 79 Ga. 726, 4 S.E. 874 (1888).
46. 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. In re Best Re-manufacturing Co., 453 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1971); Slenderella Systems
of Berkeley, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961).
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which stated that the subscriber acquired no property rights in the numbers.
On the merits, the court held that the Public Service Commission tariffs
and other state laws did not compel the company, but only gave it a right,
to demand a deposit and to change the telephone numbers of its customers
upon the failure to pay a bill. Further, the court pointed out that whatever
state law rights the company had, those rights were in direct conflict with
federal bankruptcy law, which governs after the filing of a petition. The
court held that the district court clearly had the power to enjoin interference with property in the debtor's possession and to enjoin acts, such as
the demand for a deposit, that would frustrate attempts to formulate a
plan of reorganization. The court further held that the application of FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(c), providing for the posting of a bond to indemnify a party
wrongfully enjoined, had no application in summary bankruptcy proceedings4 8 and was inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.
Finally, the court rejected the telephone company's argument that it was
entitled to priority under the "six months rule""5 on the ground that the
"six months rule" did not create a right to payment of pre-bankruptcy
debts prior to the adoption of a plan of reorganization.
The issue presented in In re Atlanta InternationalRaceway, Inc.5 0 was
the enforceability in a Chapter X proceeding of a lien for attorneys' fees
asserted under Georgia Code section 20-506.1' The debtor, Atlanta International Raceway, Inc., had executed a promissory note to the predecessor
in interest of Security National Bank in 1969, that note having been
secured by the debtor's real property. The note provided that if any part
of it should have to be collected by an attorney or by law, the holder would
be entitled to collect 10% of the principal and interest and all costs of
collection. On January 18, 1971, the debtor filed a petition under Chapter
X of the Act, and the district court entered an order pursuant to section
14852 of the Act prohibiting all creditors from prosecuting any suit or doing
any act to enforce claims against the debtor. Approximately 18 months
later, during the pendency of the Chapter X proceedings, attorneys for the
48. The provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) may apply in adversary proceedings, however.
Bankruptcy Rule 765 provides in part that Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 applies in adversary proceedings
"except that a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued on application of a trustee, receiver, or bankrupt without compliance with subdivision (c) of that
rule." BANKRUPTCY R. 765. BANKRUPTCY R. 765 is made applicable to Chapter X by
BANKRUPTCY R. 10-701.

49.

The six months rule is a judicially created priority granted in Chapter X proceedings to certain creditors of public and quasi-public enterprises providing essential services to the public. Those who extend credit to such enterprises within
six months of the filing of a bankruptcy petition under Chapter X take priority over
unsecured creditors. 508 F.2d at 1060.
50. 513 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1975).
51. GA. CODE ANN. §20-506 (Rev. 1971).
52. 11 U.S.C.A. §548 (Rev. 1970).
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holder of the note sent the debtor and the Chapter X trustee a letter,
written pursuant to Georgia Code section 20-506, declaring the note to be
in default and demanding payment of principal and interest in full within
10 days in order to avoid the assessment of attorneys' fees. No payment
was made on the debt, and the holder moved for summary judgment on
its claim for attorneys' fees amounting to over $120,000.00. The bankruptcy judge in his Report to the District Judge distinguished Security
Mortgage Co. v. Powers3 and NationalAcceptance Co. v. Zusmann,5' upon
which the bank relied, and recommended that the bank's motion be denied . 5 The district court, adopting the Bankruptcy Judge's Report, denied
the motion, and the bank appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the enforcement of the attorneys' fee lien would frustrate the reorganization proceedings and would be
inconsistent with the purposes of Chapter X. There was no way that the
debtor or the Chapter X trustee could have provided for payment within
the 10-day period in light of the statutory requirements of notice to other
creditors. Further, the court pointed out that both the trustee and the
district court had the responsibility of preserving assets essential to a plan
for reorganization, and, therefore, they were required to hold in abeyance
such demands for payment.
The bank argued that it had a right to make demand as a matter of
substantive law. The court rejected that argument, relying in part upon
In re FontainebleauHotel Corp.5
The court distinguished the Security Mortgage Co. case, in which a
similar claim in a straight bankruptcy proceeding had been enforced. In
Security Mortgage there had been no injunction against the enforcement
of liens, and since it was a straight bankruptcy proceeding, there was no
need to preserve assets to fund a plan of reorganization. The court pointed
out that reorganization proceedings are sui generis, and that rules applicable in ordinary bankruptcy may be inapplicable in Chapter X proceedings.
Even in Security Mortgage, the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for a hearing on several issues, including whether the trustee had
received notice of the bank's demand for payment. The Fifth Circuit interpreted this portion of the Supreme Court's decision to mean that the
entities or persons to whom such a demand is directed must have an
opportunity to comply with the demand.
Recognizing that the validity of the lien in question depended upon
Georgia law, the court cited Strickland v. Williams,57 for the proposition
that an injunction prohibiting the sending of such a letter invalidated any
53.
54.

278 U.S. 149, 49 S.Ct. 84, 73 L.Ed. 236 (1928).
379 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1967).

55. Report of Bankruptcy Judge W. Homer Drake, Jr., filed December 17, 1973, United
States District Court, Northern District of Georgia.
56.
57.

508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).
215 Ga. 175, 109 S.E.2d 761 (1959).
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alleged lien. For this reason, the practitioner desiring to attempt to enforce
a provision for attorneys' fees against a potential Chapter X debtor would
be well advised to make the demand at the earliest possible time.
The court also distinguished NationalAcceptance Corp. In that case, the
demand letter had been sent five days prior to the filing of a petition for
an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Act; however, no injunction had
been entered prohibiting the enforcement of creditors' claims, and there
was no automatic stay. Further, Chapter XI gives a court no power to alter
the rights of secured creditors.
In the view of the authors, the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules, and
in particular the automatic stay provisions, may well result in the Fifth
Circuit's extending this protection to Chapter XI and Chapter XII debtors
as well. Indeed, the language of the automatic stay provisions could conceivably extend their application to straight bankruptcy proceedings.
VII.

CONFLICT WITH OTHER STATUTES

In Marvin Tragash Co. v. United States Departmentof Agriculture,58 a
case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the court held that the imposition of penalties against a Chapter X159 debtor under a federal statute was
valid and enforceable despite an apparent conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act. The petitioner, a licensee under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,60 purchased several lots of fruits and vegetables in 1971 and early
1972 without paying for them, a violation of Section 261 of the Commodities
Act. In April 1972, the petitioner filed a petition under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act. Thereafter, it proposed a plan of arrangement providing
for a settlement of debts of unsecured creditors at 15% of total debt. The
plan was approved by its creditors, including the unpaid sellers of fruits
and vegetables. The bankruptcy court enjoined any payment to creditors
except through the provisions of the plan. In November 1972, the Secretary
of Agriculture filed a complaint in an administrative proceeding under the
Commodities Act. The administrative law judge found that the corporation's conduct in failing to pay the commodity sellers constituted flagrant
violation of the Commodities Act.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying in part upon the Second Circuit's
decision in Zwick v. Freeman." In that case, the court noted a conflict
between the Commodities Act and the Bankruptcy Act but held that the
conflict was not so unconscienable or excessive as to prevent the imposition
of penalties on a bankrupt. The decision in Zwick rested in part upon the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
(1967).

524 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1975).
11 U.S.C.A. §701 et seq. (Rev. 1970).
7 U.S.C.A. §499a et seq. (Rev. 1964) [hereinafter cited as the "Commodities Act."]
7 U.S.C.A. § 499b (Rev. 1964).
373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 43, 19 L.Ed.2d 96
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fact that there were references to the Bankruptcy Act in the Commodities
Act. The court stated:
It is unlikely that Congress would include references to bankruptcy in
some portions of the Commodities Act and omit them from the portions
relevant to this case if Congress had intended that the provisions challenged here would be affected by the bankruptcy of persons subject to

them .3
The court also relied in part upon cases holding that state statutes imposing reasonable penalties on bankrupts were not invalid under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution." There may be some
question as to whether reliance was well founded, however. In Perez v.
Campbell,6 5 the United States Supreme Court held that such state statutes
were unconstitutional.
On this basis, the petitioner argued that the Zwick case had little value
as precedent and that Perez required a reversal. The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court pointed out that, in the first place, the supremacy clause
has no bearing on a conflict between federal statutes. Secondly, the court
noted that the holding in Zwick also rested upon an interpretation of
Congressional intent. Since the Commodities Act contains references to
the Bankruptcy Act, Congress would have specifically exempted bankrupts from the provision of the Commodities Act in question if it had
intended to do so.
VIII.

CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

The case of In re Manuel 6 may be of special interest to practitioners in
the consumer bankruptcy field. The issue in that case was whether a purchase money security interest in consumer goods was perfected under the
Georgia Uniform Commercial Code" where the security agreement purported to secure a prior indebtedness with new collateral. The creditor had
sold certain household furniture to the bankrupt in December 1972. On
February 13, 1973, the creditor sold the bankrupt a television set pursuant
to a security agreement providing for the consolidation of the entire debt.
It was this attempt by the seller to make the television set security for debt
other than its own price that the court regarded as fatal. The creditor had
not filed any financing statement and had not taken possession of the
property. It had relied instead upon the provisions of UCC sections 9-107
63.

373 F.2d at 117.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
65. 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971).
66. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
67. GA. CODE ANN. §109A-1-101 et seq. (Rev. 1971). All citations in the discussion of the
Manuel case to the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as "UCC"] are to the
UCC as adopted in Georgia.

64.
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and 9-302. 8 Under those sections, no filing is required to perfect a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods and a purchase money security
interest exists to the extent that it is:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral
if such value is in fact so used. 9
The Fifth Circuit held:
A plain reading of the statutory requirements would indicate that they
require the purchase money security interest to be in the item purchased,
and that, as the judges below noted, the purchase money security interest
cannot exceed the price of what is purchased in the transaction wherein
the security interest is created, if the vendor is to be protected despite the
absence of filing. 0
In this regard, the court approved the reliance of the court below on the
case of In re Simpson,7 in which the secured party had failed in its attempt
to create a purchase money security interest in farm machinery since the
security agreement included a clause making the collateral security, not
only for its own price, but also for future advances. The practitioner who
on occasion acts as a bankruptcy court fiduciary may wish to keep the
Manuel and Simpson cases in mind in reviewing the security agreements
of consumer finance and similar companies.
The lengthiest, if not the most complicated, opinion handed down by the
Fifth Circuit during 1975 in the area of bankruptcy and creditors' rights
law was In re Samuels & Co.72 The essential issue in this case was the
priority of interests in proceeds between a creditor having a perfected
security interest in after-acquired property and the unpaid cash sellers of
goods.
Samuels & Co., a meat packer, financed its operation on a weekly basis
through CIT Corporation. Its obligations to CIT were secured with a perfected lien on all of its assets and inventory, including all after-acquired
property. Appellants, cattle farmers, had delivered their cattle to Samuels
& Co.'s slaughterhouse in mid-May, 1969. They subsequently received
checks for the cattle delivered, but on May 23, 1969, before those checks
were paid, CIT refused to advance any more funds to Samuels & Co. On
the same day, Samuels & Co. filed a petition in bankruptcy. The checks
68. GA. CODE. ANN. §§109A-9-107 and 9-302 (Rev. 1971).
69.
70.

GA. CODE ANN. §109A-9-107 (Rev. 1971).
507 F.2d at 993.

71.
72.

4 UCC Rep. 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975).
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issued to appellants were subsequently dishonored. Proceeds from the cattle sales were deposited with the trustee in bankruptcy pending the outcome of the litigation. At the trial level, the bankruptcy judge had held
that the sellers had priority over the financing creditor. The district court
reversed, and the sellers appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit then reversed the district court, 3 and the financing creditor appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded, 4
holding that the Packers and Stockyards Act 5 did not preclude the application of the Uniform Commercial Code.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that the selling cattle farmers had
priority to the fund under the provisions of the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code." After reviewing the historical concept of cash and credit sales with
the accompanying concept of passing of title, the court noted that the UCC
places little emphasis on the passage of title but nonetheless distinguishes
between cash and credit sales, "at least with respect to the rights of the
unpaid seller against the defaulting buyer."" The remedies of a seller for
credit are set forth in UCC section 2-702, dealing with the reclamation of
goods from an insolvent buyer where the demand is made within ten days
after receipt. UCC section 2-507 conditions the buyer's right to retain or
sell goods upon payment where payment is due and demanded on delivery.
The facts of the Samuels case established that the sale was one for cash.
The delay between delivery and payment was not credit, but rather was
the result of a procedure mandated by the [Packers and Stockyards] Act
and regulations that governed the relationship between the buyer and
seller when cattle are sold on a grade and yield basis."
There is nothing in UCC section 2-507, however, that spells out a procedure for a seller's right to reclamation. The comment following that section
"implicitly authorizes the seller's right to reclaim and simultaneously imposes a 10 day limit on that right when the buyer is insolvent."" In the
present case, the sellers failed to file a reclamation petition for almost one
year. Nonetheless, the court held that the delay in filing a reclamation
petition was not fatal since CIT Corporation had not been prejudiced.
The Code does not arbitrarily impose this limitation on the seller's rights,
but does so in order to conform with the fundamental policies of the Code
and the Bankruptcy Act. By imposing this limitation, a creditor is re73.
74.
75.
76.
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quired to promptly disclose and identify his claim to property in the
bankrupt's estate so that other creditors will not prejudice themselves.
Otherwise, a creditor might extend credit to the bankrupt subsequent to
its filing a petition on the basis of a misapprehension that the bankrupt
possesses unencumbered assets. Additionally, when all of the claims are
properly disclosed, the objective of the Bankruptcy Act, equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among its creditors, is more fully assured.A
The court noted that nothing in the record indicated that any creditors had
been prejudiced, and that, in particular, CIT Corporation had an in-depth
knowledge of the financial affairs of the bankrupt and hence was well
aware of the claims of the sellers from the very beginning.
Ultimate reclamation itself would not prejudice creditors of the Bankrupt, since where "the sale is for cash, the merchandise belongs to the
bankrupt's estate only if the buyer pays for the goods.""1 By the same
token, if a seller on credit commences a reclamation action within the 10
day limit imposed by UCC section 2-702, neither the bankrupt's creditors
nor secured creditors have any claim of prejudice since they obtain no
greater rights in the goods than does the bankrupt."
CIT Corporation argued that under UCC section 2-401(a), any attempt
to retain title is reduced to an unperfected security interest in goods, and
hence its perfected security interest would have priority under its afteracquired property clause. The court neatly sidestepped this argument by
drawing the distinction between cash sales and credit sales and holding
that UCC section 2-401(a) has no application to cash sales.
The court then went one step further in holding that CIT's rights in the
collateral were, like the rights of the debtor, conditioned upon payment.
Hence, even if the sellers had only an unperfected security interest in the
proceeds, CIT Corporation still had no valid security interest in the cattle
or the proceeds since its rights in the collateral were derived from those of
the debtor and the debtor's rights were conditioned upon payment.
Finally, the court held that CIT did not qualify as a good faith purchaser
under UCC section 2-403. Under that section, the buyer of goods may
convey to a good faith purchaser a greater right in the goods than the buyer
itself had. The court held that CIT was not such a purchaser since its rights
were no greater than those of the debtor. When the debtor failed to pay,
its rights in the collateral terminated, and with that termination, the secured creditor's rights terminated. Further, the court noted that CIT could
not meet the requirements of good faith. The court held: "Implicit in the
term 'good faith' is the requirement that CIT take its interest in the cattle
80. Id. at 147.
81. Id. at 148.
82. Practitioners having problems under UCC § §2-403 and 2-702 will be interested in the
unpublished opinion of Judge W. Homer Drake, Jr. filed on August 15, 1974 in In re American
Food Purveyors, Inc., Case No. 78172, United States District Court, Northern District of
Georgia.
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without notice of the outstanding claims of others." Since the secured
creditor was completely aware of the operations of the bankrupt, it was on
notice that checks issued to the sellers would be dishonored at the time
the secured creditor refused to advance additional funds.
As against the trustee in bankruptcy, the court recognized that under
section 70c 4 of the Act, the trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor would
defeat the rights of the sellers if they only held unperfected security interests. The court stated that the sellers did not merely have such an interest,
but rather had the right to reclaim the cattle. Thus, the issue was whether
the trustee's lien gave him a priority in the proceeds over the seller's right
to reclaim. The court stated that under UCC section 2-507 and the comments thereto, the implicit right to reclaim was subordinated only to the
rights of a good faith purchaser.
There is no mention of a subordination of the reclamation rights to the
trustee in bankruptcy, nor is there any suggestion in this provision, the
following comments, or otherwise that the drafters of the Code intended
that the sellers' right to reclaim be so subordinated. 5
Lastly, citing Bank of Marin v. England," the court pointed out that the
sellers had an overwhelming case in equity, and that equitable principles
were the primary consideration governing the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Judge Godbold filed a lengthy dissent. He took issue with the majority's
"orientation" toward the sellers against a large corporate lender.
Doing what seems fair is heady stuff. But the next seller may be a tremendous corporate conglomerate engaged in the cattle feeding business, and
the next lender a small town Texas bank. Today's heady draught may give
the majority a euphoric feeling, but it can produce tomorrow's hangover."7
Judge Godbold argued that UCC section 2-403 anticipated the precise facts
in dispute in this case, i.e., the delivery by a cash seller to a buyer who
pays by a subsequently dishonored check, and the transfer of title by the
defaulting buyer to a good faith purchaser. Although the buyer lacks the
"right" to transfer good title to goods, he nonetheless has the "power" to
do so. The definition of "purchaser" under the Code includes not only one
taking by sale, but also persons taking by voluntary mortgage pledge or
lien, and therefore is broad enough to include a lender with a perfected
security interest under Article 9 of the Code. Hence, Judge Godbold concluded that CIT Corporation was a purchaser under UCC section 2-403.
83.
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He then concluded that CIT's security interest attached to the goods because: (1) there was an agreement that the security interest attach; (2) the
secured party had given value; and (3) the debtor had rights in the collateral sufficient to permit attachment. Since a purchaser can take from a
defaulting cash buyer, and since lien creditors are purchasers, "the buyer's
rights in the property,
however marginal, must be sufficient to allow at88
tachment of a lien.
It would still be necessary under UCC section 2-403 for the secured party
to have acted in good faith in order for its interest to be superior to that of
an aggrieved seller, but the dissent had no problem with this point as a
factual matter. Judge Godbold pointed out that there was no evidence that
CIT had acted in bad faith, and in fact took issue with the majority's
finding on the basis of the record before the court that CIT had an intimate
knowledge of the debtor's obligation to third party creditors. Further, while
lack of knowledge of outstanding claims is necessary to establish a common
law bona fide purchaser for value and is similarly required in many provisions of the Code for purposes of determining the existence of a bona fide
purchaser, the Code's definition of a "good faith purchaser" contains no
element of lack of knowledge of third party claims. Hence, even if CIT
knew of the claim of the sellers, Judge Godbold would hold that this would
not prevent them from being good faith purchasers. Finally, the dissent
notes that the sellers were not defenseless; they could have avoided any
loss through the perfection of a security interest under Article 9 of the
Code.
88.

Id. at 155.

